Could Hannibal have Taken Rome
Many historians attribute Hannibal's loss in the Second Punic War to one of the decisions he made (or rather did not make). Could Hannibal really have won the war had he made different decisions? Hannibal has received much criticism in two areas. Hannibal is criticized for not taking the opportunity to attack Rome and for not convincing Rome's allies to fight for him instead of Rome. But would Hannibal really have had a better chance in winning the war if he did choose to attack Rome and would Hannibal really have succeeded in winning Rome’s allies over if he had been a better diplomat? Is Hannibal to blame for Carthage's defeat during the Second Punic War? I will be exploring this question in this essay.
According
to Livy Hannibal’s cavalry commander, Maharbal had the following to say to
Hannibal after allegedly hesitating to attack Rome after the battle of Cannae: “No one man has been blessed with all God’s gifts. You know, Hannibal,
how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory.”[1]
Livy attributes this hesitation as the one reason why Hannibal did not attack
Rome: “It is generally believed that that day’s delay was the salvation of the
City and the Empire.”[2]
Many later historians also have criticized Hannibal in much the same way.
If he had just attacked Rome at that critical moment, he could have forced Rome to sue for peace with Carthage. But can we really
believe that someone like Hannibal would hesitate to do something because it
is too difficult? If we look at everything he had done earlier in his career (everything from his crossing of the Alps to the very fact that he
decided to wage war in Italy). We can see that Hannibal is neither a coward
nor is he afraid to take risks. Therefore, if Hannibal decided not to
siege Rome, we could assume that he had a good reason for doing so.
Not
all historians agree that Hannibal would have succeeded if he had sieged Rome. Some possible logistic reasons could have prevented Hannibal from successfully
sieging Rome. John F. Shean gives us three possible logistical reasons why Hannibal
could not attack Rome. The possible reasons he gives are that Hannibal did not
have siege equipment at his disposal, that he did not have enough men, and that
he did not have enough food at his immediate disposal for a prolonged siege. Although
it is likely that Hannibal’s decision to not attack Rome was not related to
siege equipment. The idea
that Hannibal would have been lacking in siege equipment is derived from the
idea that Hannibal left his siege equipment in Hispania in order to move more
quickly and therefore did not have any siege equipment upon entering Rome,
although even if Hannibal had left his siege equipment behind it still is quite
possible that Hannibal would have been able to construct siege weapons on site if
needed:
During
this era, there were many 'siege experts' available who would hire themselves
out to whomever was willing to pay for their services. Considering Carthage's
reliance on mercenary soldiers during the Punic Wars, it is hard to believe
that she would not supply her armies with these individuals. These experts were
the most important factor in the conduct of siege warfare. The actual equipment
used was made of wood and could be built on-site when needed. (John F. Shean, 1996)
Also, it does
not make sense that Hannibal would march all the way to Rome only to realize at
the last moment that he does not have any siege equipment at his disposal. I
therefore say that this reason is the least likely.
I
find the logistical problems with either food or manpower much more likely than
siege equipment. Carthage only managed to resupply Hannibal once in the Second
Punic War. Because of this Hannibal would have had to obtain all the resources
he needed from Italy itself. These resources of course included manpower.
Hannibal was forced to reinforce his army with what he could find in Italy. Hannibal
must have been very shorthanded by the end of the Battle of Cannae. We must
remember that even though Hannibal did win a number of great victories against
the Romans he still would have undertaken some losses and we simply do not know
how many men Hannibal had at his disposal after the battle at Cannae. (John F. Shean, 1996) Even upon entering Italy Hannibal had
a Handicap. According to Livy Hannibal lost 36,000 men crossing the Alps.[3]
Although we cannot be sure how many Hannibal did lose when crossing the Alps. Also,
Hannibal’s losses were not being replaced seeing as he had problems with
convincing Rome’s allies to join his army. He did have some success in
convincing some Gauls in the north of Italy to join him, but he had some
trouble thereafter. Taking
this all into account it is quite probable that Hannibal simply did not have
enough men to siege Rome.
It is quite possible
that feeding his armies could have been even a greater problem to Hannibal than
manpower: “Of all the problems associated with a march on Rome, probably the
single greatest issue is the question of supply.” (John F. Shean, 1996) Because Hannibal was not supplied
by Carthage, he would have been forced to raid Italy’s countryside for food. Both
Livy and Polybius state that Hannibal ravaged the countryside in order to
provoke the Romans into attacking him. (John F. Shean, 1996) It is possible that Hannibal did
not do this in order to provoke the Romans, but in order to feed his army. Because of this lack of
food, he could not stay in one spot for a long period of time: seeing as he
always had to move on in order to look for more food for his army:
The need for provisions was a key
consideration behind many of the moves which Hannibal's army made and,
ultimately, restricted his freedom of movement, as well as forcing him to
forego many strategic options which might have had a decisive impact on the
outcome of the war. (John F. Shean,
1996)
According to
Livy Hannibal’s army was accompanied by pack animals, but these animals
did not draw carriages. It is possible that Hannibal might have done this in order for
his army to move faster. If
he only used pack animals with no carriages this would have limited the amount
of food he could take with him at any given time. (John F. Shean, 1996) John F. Shean
has made an estimation of how long Hannibal could keep his army fed assuming
that he only relied on pack animals like mules to carry his supplies. Taking into
consideration the possible size of the army (according to the different
accounts of Hannibal’s army size), how much each man need to eat per day, the
possible amount of pack animals that were needed to carry their supplies, and
how much those animals would have had to eat per day, he has estimated that
Hannibal at most could take nineteen days of food with him at one given time. If his
estimations are correct: there would not nearly have been enough food at
Hannibal’s disposal to siege a large city like Rome. I therefore say that the
two most likely reasons for Hannibal not sieging Rome most likely is that he either
did not have enough manpower or not enough food or possibly both of these
things.
Some
historians say that Hannibal did not attack Rome because he had an alternative
strategy. The alternative strategy was that he rather wanted to focus on
bringing Rome’s allies to his side. But Hannibal did not only start trying to
convert Rome’s allies after the battle of Cannae: he already started doing this
as soon as he entered Italy. By fighting the war in Italy Hannibal could not
only fight Rome on his own terms but also, fight Rome with its own
resources:
There
has been general agreement both in ancient and in modern times that Hannibal's
hope of final victory rested mainly on the chance of arousing widespread
disaffection to the cause of Rome among the populations of Italy. (J. S.
Reid, 2019)
Hannibal did not have the right amount of
manpower to take on the might of Rome. According to Livy the number of troops
that Hannibal had to his disposal upon entering Italy could have been 100,000
infantry and 20,000 cavalry at most[4],
but the number might have been considerably less, whereas according to Polybius
Rome had as many as 770,000 potential fighting men to their disposal.[5]
If Hannibal therefore wanted to defeat Rome he simply had to increase his
manpower and converting Rome’s allies would not only increase his own manpower
as well as supply him with resources, but also decrease Rome’s manpower as well
as its resources. Fighting the war in Italy and trying to drive a wedge between
Rome and its allies therefore was Hannibal’s most likely chance of success, but why did Hannibal have
so little success in convincing Rome’s allies to join him? Was this failure
due to a lack in Hannibal’s diplomatic skills or were there other reasons? There
are several reasons why Rome’s allies would not have defected regardless of how
good a diplomat Hannibal was. Many of the soldiers in Hannibal’s army were not
Carthaginians: they therefore did not feel any sense of patriotism or loyalty
towards Carthage or Hannibal. Their interest in fighting for Hannibal purely
rested in loot. To keep these soldiers interested Hannibal would have to let
them loot once in a while. In addition to this Hannibal also was raiding
Italy’s countryside to feed his army. (J. S. Reid, 2019) This would not have sit well with
Rome’s allies at all.
In
addition to raiding their countryside, Hannibal also showed some kindness to
Rome’s allies. According to Polybius Hannibal would execute his Roman hostages
upon defeating a Roman army, but he would free the allied hostages.[6]
The idea was that they would then spread the word of Hannibal as their
liberator. This contrast in what Hannibal promised and what he did must have
had a major impact on how the Italians saw him:
“Taken as a whole, it is
difficult to identify a coherent method to Hannibal’s diplomatic activities,
except that he was willing to vary his tactics as circumstances dictated. It
has been argued that this hurt his war effort, because his use of “terror
tactics” contradicted his self-portrayal as a liberator, and thus undermined
his credibility with the Italians.” (Dexter Hoyes, 2011)
Although
it would seem that this situation was unavoidable: Hannibal simply had to raid
Italy’s countryside in order to feed his army despite the fact that this
created a paradoxical image of Hannibal as someone that promised freedom to the
Italians yet destroyed their property.
Upon
entering Italy, Hannibal allied himself with some Gauls in the north of
Italy who had only recently been subjugated by the Romans. It has been argued
that these Gaul’s also attributed to the Italian's disdain towards Hannibal. (J. S. Reid, 1915). This is natural seeing
as the Gaul’s have a history of raiding the Italians. Although I would say that
there would have been the same amount of hatred toward Hannibal as there was to
the Gauls amongst the Italians: when the Romans thought against Carthage, they
too had to send troops to fight the Carthaginians. The Italians therefore might
also at least feel some form of resentment towards the Carthaginians. The fact
that Hannibal was a foreigner and a foreigner from a country on which the
Italians had made war before at must have made it much harder for Hannibal
to win Rome’s allies over. Aside from the fact that there were several
things that made diplomacy with the Italians difficult for Hannibal ignorance
of Italian Culture could also have played a part in Hannibal’s attempt to win
over Rome’s allies:
In
posing as the liberators of Italy the Carthaginians were speaking the
diplomatic
language
of the Greek world of the Hellenistic East. But the success of such propaganda
is likely to have been handicapped by the apparent lack of any Italian
tradition” (Andrew Erskine, 1993)
Because
Hannibal did not understand Italian culture Rome’s allies might have struggled
to understand the message he was trying to bring across. As well as the fact
that he would not necessarily have promised them anything they would have been
interested in.
It is quite possible that Hannibal relied on a quick victory. (John
Lazenby, 1996) He possibly thought that he could invade Italy, defeat the
Romans a couple, and thus cause Rome’s allies to turn on Rome. He might have
assumed that the relationship between Rome and its allies was similar to that
of Carthage and therefore have similarly treated the situation. Of
course, the relationship between Rome and its allies was somewhat different from
the relationship between Carthage and its allies. When things did not go the
Carthaginians' way in the First Punic war the Carthaginians Numidian allies
turned on them. Hannibal might have thought that Rome’s allies would do the
same if he won a couple of battles against the Romans. Although I do not
believe that this necessarily means that Hannibal was a bad diplomat, it only
means that he was ignorant of certain matters. It also is quite possible that
Hannibal could not have won Rome’s allies over no matter how good a
diplomat he was. Italian prejudice towards him coupled with the fact that the
Roman alliance system was much sturdier than Hannibal's though could have meant
that the Italians would not turn on Rome no matter what Hannibal did.
Even
if I do not believe that Hannibal could possibly have won the war with the
resources he had at his disposal I still believe that there was one area that
Carthage should have focused on more. If Carthage had focused more on this
particular area it could have saved Hannibal: their navy. At the time of the
Second Punic War. In 218 BC Carthage had 100 ships at their disposal whereas
Rome had 220 (B. D. Hoyos, 2019). This is why
Hannibal decided to enter Italy via land and why Carthage was unable to resupply
Hannibal, seeing as Rome thwarted their every attempt except one in doing so.
According to B. D. Hoyos, there should have been enough money for Carthage to
build a larger fleet. If they had done so they could have kept Hannibal going.
Hannibal might even have been able to attack after the battle of Cannae if
Carthage had supplied him with more troops and food.
Hannibal’s
loss in the Second Punic War might therefore not be due to Hannibal’s making the
wrong decision. Hannibal simply did not have enough resources at his disposal.
If Carthage had a bigger fleet, they could have given him that resources. I
therefore say that Carthage lost the second Punic War because they did not
spend enough time and effort in their navy.
Bibliography
John F. Shean. “Hannibal's Mules_ The
Logistical Limitations of Hannibal's Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C” Historia: Zeitschrift
für Alte Geschichte Franz
Steiner Verlag. 45 (2019), 159-187
John Lazenby. “Was Mahabal Right” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical
Studies. 67 (1996), 39-48
Dexter
Hoyes, A Companion to the Punic Wars (Blackwell
Publishing Ltd, 2011)
J. S. Reid, “Problems with the second Punic War.” The Journal of Roman Studies 5 (1915), 87-124
Andrew Erskine, “Hannibal and the freedom of the Italians.” Hermes 121 (1993), 58-62
B. D. Hoyos, “Hannibal what kind of genius.” Greece & Rome (2019), 171-180
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